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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SOME REPRESENTATIVE DECISIONS
WILLIAM F. SWINDLER*
In an attempt to encourage a dialogue on the chronically neg-
lected subject of state constitutional law, a review of state constitution
making in the past quarter of a century was recently published.' The
present paper is an attempt to complement that description of the prob-
lems and trends in this area with a summary of fundamental and repre-
sentative judicial commentary. These two reviews-one relating to the
constitutions themselves and the other to the decisional law on the sub-
ject-it is hoped will provide background for a continuing discussion of
state constitutionalism in this and other professional journals.
Almost a century ago Thomas M. Cooley in his now classic (although
now obsolete) treatise pointed out that the American characteristic of
reducing constitutional provisions to writing had three major conse-
quences. In the first place, it set discernible limits to the areas where
the people were disposed to "not only tie up the hands of their official
agencies, but their own hands as well." Secondly, a written constitution
either specifically or by implication vested in the legislature "as the de-
partment most nearly representing its sovereign authority" the state's
power to amend, revise or supplant its existing document. Finally, a
constitution reduced to a written text made necessary the judicial
function of review and interpretation.
2
Judicial review, under this definition, is an essential element in state
constitutional law, as it is in the analogous federal area. The body of
decisional law for state constitutions, quite as much as for the Constitu-
tion of the United States, is thus as significant as the text of the instru-
ment itself. But to the degree that state constitutions differ from that
of the nation-e.g., in character, theory and subject-matter-the differ-
ing principles of decisional law need to be recapitulated. While this will
be elementary to the esoteric minority of scholars who have dealt with
* Member of the Nebraska and D. C. Bars. LL.B., University of Nebraska, Ph.D.,
University of Missouri. Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William and Mary.
1. Graves, State Constitutional Law: A Twenty-five Year Sumary, 8 Win. & Mary
L. Rev. 1 (1966).
2. 1 COOLFY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 81 (8th ed. Carrington 1927).
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the subject, it is hoped that it will help to enlarge the circle of the
discussion in the future.
SomE BASIC PRINCIPLES
The Constitution as Original hegislation.
The constitutions of forty-eight of the fifty states3 have preambles
which proclaim that "we, the people" of the particular state have estab-
lished the instrument in question. Many of the constitutions stipulate in
their legislative article that the enacting clause of statutes must pro-
claim that "the people" or the legislature or the people as represented
in the legislature constitute "the sovereign authority by which they are
enacted and declared to be law." 4 This suggests that in most 5 instances
the same popular sovereignty originates both the constitution and the
general laws of the state. Superficially, at least, this fact would tend
to support an argument that the state constitution is an act of organic
legislation subject to established rules of statutory construction.6
A fact more substantially supporting the proposition is the length and
variegated subject matter contained in most state constitutions, and the
tendency to treat most if not all of it as self-executing.7 Courts have
been at pains to stress the basic differences between the organic instru-
ment and other legislation by suggesting that, unlike an ordinary statute,
a constitution "is intended not merely to meet existing conditions but to
govern future contingencies." 8 A constitution, said the Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals in 1952, "preserves in basic form the pre-
existing laws, rights, mores, habits, and modes of thought and life of
the :people as developed under the common law and as existing at the
time of its adoption to the extent stated therein." 9
Corroborating the Virginia view, and in terms reminiscent of Edward
3. Vermont and West Virginia do not have preambles, but the tenor of their con-
stitutions is consistent with the rest of the states.
4. State ex rel. Gouge v. Burrow, 119 Tenn. 376, 104 S. W. 526 (1907).
5. But cf., Montana Const., Art. V, § 1, where "the people" enacting clause is re-
served for initiated legislation, while in Art. V, § 20 the legislative enacting clause is
required for law enacted by bill. Cf. Vaughn & Ragsdale Co. v. Bd. of Equalization,
109 Mont. 52, 96 P. 2d 420 (1939).
6. Cf. Yelle v. Bishop, 347 P. 2d 1081 ('Wash., 1959).
7. Cf. notes 27-29, infra.
8. Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 94 N. E. 2d 814 (1950), aff'd. 89 Ohio App. 504, 96
N. E. 2d 314 (1950), app. dism. 155 Ohio St. 98, 97 N. E. 2d 549 (1951).
9. Dean v. Paolicelli, 194 Va. 219, 72 S. E. 2d 506 (1952).
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S. Corwin's concept of the "higher law" doctrine, 10 the Tennessee
Supreme Court in 1962 observed: "A constitution is not the beginning
of a community, nor does it originate and create institutions of govern-
ment; instead, it assumes the existence of an established system which
is to continue in force and is based on pre-existing rights, laws and
modes of thought." ' A more pragmatic differentiation has been offered
by the Alabama court: A constitution is paramount legislation, and
"to it all rules of evidence, procedure and expediency in conflict with its
mandates and prohibitions must yield." 12 It is "the objective standard of
conduct by which all departments of the government shall be bound." 1-1
The question of uniformity or consistency of interpretation of a con-
stitutional provision has been vigorously debated; in view of the fre-
quency with which state constitutions are amended or supplanted, it
may be argued that state courts are more justified in clinging to the
doctrine that the provision "does not change with times or conditions." 14
The tendency of state courts in the twentieth century to construe both
constitutions and statutes with reasonable liberality is circumscribed by
the basic rule that where the constitutional clause is free of all ambiguity
it will be given a strict construction. 15 Another basic rule of statutory
interpretation-that the "mischief to be remedied" is a presumptive guide
to the intent of the framers-lends an essential degree of flexibility. Thus
in Adams v. Bolin16 the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the
constitutional restraint upon legislative amendment of initiated measures
was to be limited to those measures adopted by less than a majority of
the electorate. In Lancaster v. Board of Commissioners17 the Colorado
court held that a prohibition of changes in salary affected the office-
holders rather than the offices themselves, so that a former incumbent
could be reappointed to an office after its salary had been increased. The
purpose of the constitutional rule being to guard against legislative in-
10. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
Harv. L. Rev. 149, 365 (1929-29).
11. Washington County Election Comm. v. Johnson City, 350 S. W. 2d 601 (1962).
12. Alexander v. State ex rel. Carver, 150 S. E. 2d 204 (1963).
13. In re Opinion of the Justices, 85 N. E. 2d 761 (Mass., 1949); and cf. Wheeler v.
Board of Trustees, 200 Ga. 323, 37 S. E. 2d 322 (1946).
14. Tray. Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 124 Tex. 45, 76 S. W. 2d 1007 (1934); cf. also State
ex rel. Clithero v. Showalter, 159 Wash. 519, 293 P. 1000 (1930), app. dism. 284 U. S. 573
(1931).
15. Cf. State ex rel. Willis v. Montfort, 93 Wash. 4, 159 P. 889 (1916).
16. 74 Ariz. 269, 247 P. 2d 617 (1952).
17. 115 Colo. 261, 171 P. 2d 987 (1946).
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fluence upon officeholders, "the limit of the purpose makes the limit of
the rule."
The Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. McDazid v. Barrett"
ruled that a statute granting appropriations to widows of officeholders
for the remainder of the unexpired term did not violate the constitutional
rule against increasing emoluments to incumbents; and the Texas court
in Farrar v. Board of TrusteesD came to a similar conclusion. Thus a
narrow construction of a constitutional restraint permits a wider range
of legislative action. The Missouri Supreme Court summarized the ap-
plication of this principle in State ex rel. Dalton v. Dearing:20 The precise
phraseology of the constitution "is fundamental, and not open to change,
except insofar as interpretation is necessary to arrive at the meaning of
the fundamental act itself. When that meaning has been ascertained it
cannot be changed even by statute." But to determine meaning, "the
organic law is subject to the same general rules of construction as
other laws."
The rules of construction applied to state constitutions, accordingly,
are rules of statutory construction, with somewhat more deference to
the presumption of dignity and weight derived from the fundamental
nature of the instrument. Thus, apparent conflicts in different pro-
visions within the same document will be construed, if possible, to give
proper effect to both rather than to declare one to be invalid in the
light of the other.21 Courts consistently declare that "no one provision
of the constitution is to be separated from all the others and to be con-
sidered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to ef-
fectuate the great purpose of the instrument." 2
Since it is almost universally asserted that a state constitution is a limi-
tation of power, it follows, first, that any clause limiting a power is in
itself evidence of the existence of the power; and second, that legislative
enactments themselves are to be presumed constitutional if there is no
express constitutional prohibition applicable to the subject of the enact-
ment. "Whatever the people have not, by their constitution, restrained
18. 370 1. 478, 19 N. E. 2d 356 (1939).
19. 150 Tex. 572, 243 S. W. 2d 688 (1951).
20. 364 Mo. 475, 263 S. W. 2d 391, 385 (1954).
21. Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N. E. 2d 270 (1941); cf. Meyers v. Flournoy,
209 La. 812, 25 S. 2d 601 (1946); Willis v. Kalmbach, 109 Va. 475, 64 S. E. 342 (1909).
22. City of Portsmouth v. Weiss, 145 Va. 94, 133 S. E. 781 (1926).
23. Cf. Morgan v. Commonwealth, 168 Va. 731, 191 S. E. 791 (1937), and the cases
cited in 19 Am. Jua. 2d, Constitutional Law, S 17.
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themselves from doing, they, through their representatives in the legisla-
ture, may do," declared the Colorado court,24 while the Texas court
concluded that where the state constitution in terms prohibited a statu-
tory remedy by "special law" it left the remedy available by general
law.25
Thus the state constitution is logically a part of the legislative process
of the state, and the construction which the legislature itself places upon
its organic instrument is given great weight in judicial interpretation. 26
Moreover, since the records of convention debates are fortunately more
subject to preservation than those of ordinary legislation, the courts will
also rely heavily upon these proceedings for interpretation." Although
most, and perhaps all, of the provisions of a state constitution are self-
executing, it is conceded that supplemental legislative action is permissi-
ble.28 The primary concern of modern judicial interpretation, however,
is that the legislature should not, by its action or inaction, frustrate any
specific provision in the constitution. 9
Amending, Revising and Supplanting Constitutions.
In less than two centuries, the people of the fifty states have adopted
more than 130 constitutions, and have copiously amended them in the
intervals between adoptions. The amending process itself may take one
of three forms-either by legislation, by convention, or by initiative. The
authority of the people to change their fundamental instrument "is un-
limited except where prohibited by the Federal Constitution or in conflict
with federal law enacted pursuant to constitutionally granted authority,"
the Arizona court has ruled.30 Even if the people purport to impose limi-
24. District Landowners Trust v. Adams County, 104 Colo. 146, 89 P. 2d 251 (1939).
25. Jones v. Williams, 121 Tex. 94, 45 S. W. 2d 130 (1931); and cf. People v.
Hutchinson, 172 II. 486, 50 N. E. 599 (1898); Postelwaite v. Edson, 102 Kan. 619, 171
P. 773 (1917).
26. Cf. Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 782, 91 S. E. 2d 660 (1956); King & Queen County
v. Cox, 155 Va. 687, 156 S. E. 755 (1931); Cherey v. Long Beach, 282 N. Y. 382, 26
N. E. 2d 945 (1940).
27. State v. Lyons, 40 Del. 77, 5 A.2d 495 (1939); Household Fin. Corp. v. Shaffner, 356
Mo. 808, 203 S. W. 2d 734 (1947).
28. All such legislation, however, is considered subordinate to the constitutional clause.
Cf. State ex rel. Randolph County v. Walden, 357 Mo. 167, 206 S. W. 2d 979 (1947);
and cf. Roberts v. Spray, 71 Ariz. 60, 223 P. 2d 808 (1950); People v. Western Air
Lines, 42 Calif. 2d 621, 268 P. 2d 723 (1954), app. dism., 348 U. S. 859 (1954).
29. Cf. Swift & Co. v. Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 52 S. E. 821 (1906); Morgan v.
Board of Supervisors, 67 Ariz. 133, 192 P. 2d 236 (1948); People v. Carroll, 3 N. Y. S.
2d 686, 171 N. Y. S. 2d 812, 148 N. E. 2d 875 (1958).
30. A. F. of L. v. American Sash & Door Co., 67 Ariz. 20, 189 P. 2d 912 (1948).
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tations upon their own amending power, a failure to comply literally
with technical or unimportant features of the limitation should not be
permitted to frustrate the popular will;31 and while repeals by implica-
don are not encouraged, the court is disposed in instances of manifest
conflict between later provisions and earlier ones to find that the later
amendment has impliedly repealed or abrogated the earlier provision.3 2
There is some conflict of authority on the effect of amendments upon
the existing instrument; the Louisiana appellate court in 1961 ruled that
an amendment was not to be regarded as part of the original document,
but as a codicil altering or rescinding part of the original,s while the
Texas Supreme Court in 1966 declared that the constitution was to be
read as a whole and as if every part had been adopted at the same time
and all parts reconciled to each other2r The more common statement
of the effect of amendments is that the primary obligation of the court
is to reconcile the amendment and the original but that failing this the
amendment is to prevail.3 5 Every reasonable presumption, both of law
and fact, is to be indulged as to the constitutionality of a constitutional
amendment once it has been adopted;3 and where one part of an amend-
ment is found valid while another is found void, the court will under-
take to hold the parts severable in order to effectuate the valid party7
The constitutionality of a constitutional amendment may turn upon
the question of the validity of the procedure followed in submitting the
amendment to the electorate,38 or it may turn upon a conflict between
the state instrument and the Federal Constitution.39 While, as in federal
constitutional law, the courts continually admonish themselves that the
wisdom of an amendment or other legislative act is not a judicial ques-
tion, the greater variety of methods of amendment in many state con-
stitutions imposes upon state courts a greater responsibility for adjudicat-
ing the issue of validity of the amendment itself.40 The general rule of
statutory construction, that an amendment subsequently found invalid
31. Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P. 2d 662 (1948).
32. Egbert v. City of Dunsieth, 74 N. D. 1, 24 N. W. 2d 907 (1946).
33. Fullilove v. Cas. Co. of New York, 129 S. 2d 816 (1961).
34. Purcell v. Lindsey, 314 S. W. 2d 283 (1958).
35. Cf. State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre, 113 N. W. 2d 679 (N. D., 1964).
36. Opinion of Justices, 133 A. 2d 790 (N. H. 1966).
37. Carpenter v. State, 139 N. W. 2d 541 (Web., 1966).
38. Cf. Livermore v. Waite, 102 Calif. 113, 36 P. 424 (1894).
39. Cf. notes 60-64 infra.
40. Cf. People v. Sours, 31 Colo. 309,74 P. 167 (1903).
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does not revive the portions of the instrument as they existed before
the amendment, applies to state constitutional law.4'
Amendments are generally interpreted as having prospective rather
than retrospective effects,4' but courts have not hesitated to hold that
where the intention of the framers was not to the contrary the pro-
visions may apply to pending litigation and criminal proceedings."
This holding is more generally applied to new constitutions, since the
adoption of an entire new organic law means the extinguishing of the
basis of judicial process under the prior organic law. Some hypothetical
issues of due process and equal protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment are obvious in this circumstance, but no litigation has developed to
bring into effect any enlightening decisional rules on the subject.
The general rule is that when a new constitution is adopted, all legis-
lation inconsistent with any of its provisions is rendered of no effect."
But a new constitution cannot impair a contractual obligation created
under prior state law which is found to be within the protection of the
federal constitutional prohibition of impairment of such obligations. 45
Most new constitutions include a preservation clause continuing in effect
all statutes not inconsistent with themselves;46 and the common law of,
the state is presumed to continue in effect unless a provision of the new
instrument is in derogation thereof.Y1
Relationships Between Past and Present Constitutions.
Because of the frequency with which, since 1776, states have changed
their organic law-even though a chronic complaint has to do witih the
archaic nature of many contemporary constitutions-a unique question
in state constitutional law has to do with the relationships between the
present instrument and prior ones. Particularly when a body of deci-
sional law has been developed over a period of time extending through
several such changes, the question is one of practical urgency.
Where a provision in the contemporary constitution is the same or
substantially the same as in a prior constitution, and there are no cir-
41. Davis v. Synhorst, 225 F. Supp. 689 (D. C. Iowa, 1964).
42. Cf. Robinson v. Ind. A. L. & M. Co., 128 Ark. 550, 194 S. W. 870 (1917).
43. Cassard v. Tracy, 52 La. Ann. 835, 27 S. 368 (1899); State v. Bland, 354 Mo. 391,
189 S. V. 2d 542 (1945); State v. Richardson, 47 S. C. 166, 25 S. E. 220 (1896).
44. Criswell v. Mont. C. R. Co., 18 Mont. 167, 44 P. 525 (1896).
45. Cf. Vet. Welfare Board v. Riley, 189 Calif. 159, 208 P. 678 (1922); Nelson v.
Haywood County, 87 Tenn. 781, 11 S. W. 885 (1889).
46. Leser v. Lowenstein, 129 Md. 244,98 A. 712 (1916).
47. Cf. generally Jeim v. Jelm, 155 Ohio St. 226, 98 N. E. 2d 401 (1951).
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cumstances suggesting a contrary intention on the part of the framers of
the new instrument, the courts will hold themselves bound to both
the legislative and judicial construction of the provision under the prior
constitution. 4 Any changes in the wording of a provision in the new
constitution will be presumed to have been intentional;49 but where
there is reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the provision in the new
constitution, reference may be had to the language and the construc-
tion of the analogous provision in the prior constitution.50
Historically, new states in the westward movement of the nation bor-
rowed in whole or in part from the constitutions of older states in pre-
paring their first constitutions. The courts have stated as a general rule
that the adoption of a specific provision from the specific constitution of
another state carries with it the construction of that provision as de-
vised by the court of last resort in the original state.51 Where the
evidence is not conclusive as to the specific instrument from which the
provision was borrowed, however, the construction of the courts of the
other state or states is only advisory as to the legislature and not bind-
ing upon the judiciary. 2
However, in construing a constitutional provision in one state, de-
cisions of the courts in any other state having substantially the same
provision will be given great weight.53 But when a grant is made to a
private corporation under one constitution and the corporation merges
with another after this granting policy has been abolished under a new
constitution, the merged entity cannot claim the benefits under the
prior instrument." While a rule of law fixed under one constitution
applies under succeeding constitutions when the provision on which
it is based is the same,"5 a change in public policy inferred from a change
in the constitutional provision qualifies or terminates the effect of the
rule.
A question peculiar to state constitutions, with their multiplicity, arises
when a given principle is adjudicated under one constitution, the prin-
ciple itself is unmentioned in a succeeding constitution, but is re-
48. Cf. Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28 S. W. 2d 515 (1930).
49. Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N. Y. 185, 81 N. E. 124 (1907).
50. Newport News v. Woodward, 104 Va. 58, 51 S. E. 193 (1905).
51. State ex rel. Gerry v. Edwards, 42 Mont. 135, 111 P. 734 (1910).
52. Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 291 P. 2d 400 (1955).
53. Norfolk & P. T. Co. v. Ellington, 108 Va. 245, 61 S. E. 779 (1908).
54. Adams v. Yazee & Miss. Valley R. Co., 77 Miss. 194, 24 S. 200 (1898); aff'd. 180
U. S. 1 (1900), reh. den. 181 U.S. 580 (1901).
55. Tray. Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 124 Tex. 45, 76 S. W. 2d 1007 (1934).
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introduced into a third. The Missouri Supreme Court, in Rathjen v.
Reorganized School Dist.,56 had occasion to comment on such a situation.
In this case a phrase, "for purposes of education" had been used in the
1875 constitution and a substantial body of case law had grown up
around it; then in 1945 the new constitution substituted the phrase, "for
school purposes." A 1950 amendment then elaborated upon the powers
of the state with reference to educational expenditures, and in a test
case it was contended that the case law developed under the 1875 con-
stitution was controlling. The court rejected the argument, observing
that a 1950 amendment made presumably in knowledge of the altered
language of a 1945 constitution cut off the adjudication under the 1875
instrument.
Obviously, a court may rely upon constructions under earlier con-
stitutions relating to provisions which have been continued unchanged
into the text of succeeding constitutions.57 Generally, too, the courts
will avoid interfering with a legislative construction which tends to rely
on interpretations under superseded instruments, unless "public mis-
chief" will be encouraged by the practice.,8 And where the intention of
the framers of a later constitution or amendment is manifestly to alter
the meaning of the prior language, the court places its primary reliance
upon the demonstrated intent of the later framers. 59
Relationships to Federal Constitution and Law.
A final fundamental ingredient in state constitutional law is the matter
of limitations placed upon the state instrument by the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States and the federal laws enacted in pur-
suance thereof. There are two definite areas of decisional law relating
to this matter. The one concerns the case of a manifest conflict between
the federal instrument and the state instrument, where the latter must
yield .6  The second concerns a provision in the federal constitution or
law which has been incorporated verbatim into the state document. In
such situations, a state which adopts the language of federal law or the
United States Constitution, adopts with it the interpretation which it
has received in the federal courts.6 1
56. 365 Mo. 518, 284 S. W. 2d 516 (1955).
57. In re Advisory Op., 112 S. 2d 843 (Fla., 1959).
58. Franklin Nat. Bank v. Clark, 212 N. Y. S. 2d 942 (1961).
59. Diamond v. Parkersburg-Aetna Corporation, 122 S. E. 2d 436 (W. Va., 1961).
60. Cf. Russell v. Croy, 164 Mo. 69, 63 S. W. 849 (1901).
61. State v. Henry, 37 N. M. 536, 25 P. 2d 204 (1933).
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Familiar and universally used constitutional phrases-"due process"
being the best example-must be given the same meaning in all jurisdic-
tions, and therefore tend to follow the definitions and applications of the
federal courts. 62 Congressional acts passed under the authority of the
Federal Constitution are part of the supreme law of the land, and over-
ride anything in the constitution and laws of any state which may be in
conflict.0 The supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution in effect
makes such statutes part of the law of each state. As the Washington
Supreme Court stated in Exchange Nat. Bank v. United States," the
duty of the state court is "not to determine what ... Congress should
have excepted [from a federal statute] but to determine what it has,
for, enjoying the power to except those which it desires, its choice must
stand unassailed when coupled with the right to make it."
The reapportionment decisions of the United States Supreme Court5
have precipitated the greatest volume of constitutional rulings in this
subject-area in this generation. The pressure which these decisions have
put upon the federal courts to enter the arena of state government has
been resisted through a variety of propositions. Yet the fact remains
that where there is unavoidable conflict between national and state con-
stitutions, the former prevails-a rule which obtained long before ap-
portionment became a major element in constitutionalism.66
"A state may not deprive the Federal courts of the right and power
to consider the validity of legislative enactments nor to review judicial
decrees which involve the question of whether such action invades or
upholds Federally guaranteed constitutional rights," the federal court
in Kansas has declared. 67 And since the federal rule of law is that "ef-
fecting the will of the majority of the people of the state is the foun-
dation of any apportionment plan," "I all state instruments, including
constitutional amendments, relating to apportionment must be judicially
evaluated in terms of the federal rule.
With the steady growth of the jurisprudence of the fourteenth
amendment over the years, the subjects of federally guaranteed rights
which must be accommodated by state constitutionalism have steadily
62. Cf. Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512 (1885); Robertson v. State, 63 Tex.
Crim. 216, 142 S. V. 533 (1911).
63. Bunch v. Cole, 263 U. S. 250 (1923); Re Guerra, 94 Vt. 1, 110 A. 224 (1920).
64. 147 Wash. 176, 265 P. 722 (1928); aff'd. 279 U. S. 80 (1929).
65. Cf. cases beginning with Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962).
66. Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 142 N. W. 2d 355, 361 (Ia., 1966).
67. Long v. Avery, 251 F. Supp. 541 (D. C. Kans., 1966).
68. Sincock v. Duffy; 215 F. Supp. 169 (D. *C. Del., 1963).
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increased. Apportionment followed upon the desegregation decisions,"
and was followed by the right-to-counsel decisions.7 These are all
symptomatic of a steady change in American society from the de-
centralized and sometimes atomistic character of the past to the cen-
tripetal social and political economy of today. The effect of the new
Federalism upon state constitutional law cannot yet be fully assessed, but
it is obviously substantial.
These are the basic elements in the frame of reference for state con-
stitutional law-its character as original legislation, the varied procedures
for amending or replacing the instrument, the continuity or disconti-
nuity of legal precepts in the succession of constitutions within the same
state, and the overriding authority of federal constitutional law in an
expanding area of jurisdiction. There remains for further examination
the representative decisions concerning the major adjectival elements
in the constitutionalism-the legislative, executive and judicial functions
-and the general subject of intergovernmental relations, interstate and
intrastate.
(To be Continued)
69. Cf. cases beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954).
70. Cf. cases climaxing in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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